PRIMARY SOURCES

ON COPYRIGHT

(1450-1900)

Controversy on reproduction of foreign works in the Netherlands and of Dutch works overseas (1873-1876)

Source: Nieuwsblad voor den boekhandel, vol. 40 (1873), pp. 274, 285, 291-292, 296, 311-313, 343, 371-372, 473-474, 482, 490; vol. 41 (1874), pp. 78, 111-112, 141-142, 253-254, 303-304, Bijvoegsel, p. 545-554; vol. 42 (1875), pp. 42-44, 69-72, 92, 139-141, 387, 393, 398-399, 405, 411-412, 424, 429, 430; & vol. 43 (1876), pp. 426, 435, 448, 453-454, 460, 465-466, 472, 477, 478, 483-484; http://tijdschriften.kb.nl/

Citation:
Controversy on reproduction of foreign works in the Netherlands and of Dutch works overseas (1873-1876), Primary Sources on Copyright (1450-1900), eds L. Bently & M. Kretschmer, www.copyrighthistory.org

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SUBMITTED LETTERS.

To the Editors of the 'Newsletter for the Book trade'.

In your No. of 31 Aug., Mr. B. van Dijk expressed his astonishment that I have raised my voice against the encouragement of our Government to conclude a treaty with Germany "to protect the literary property" at the Maastricht Congress.
I wish to account for my attitude here.
It seems to me very natural and equitable that an author demands reward for his work. The workman is worthy of his wages. If the author, for that which he offers can stipulate no satisfactory price, unless the state under the name of copyright protects the privilege, which to a certain publisher, to the exclusion of others, gives the authority to reproduce the work of the author by means of the printing press, -- than, I think, the State is not disloyal to the general principles of government by bringing to life such a copyright, and to reserve enjoyment thereof for the author and his assign publishers.
But one should not wish to raise this privilege (because it is) to a natural right; one should not, gazing at a comparison with property rights of a completely different order, insist that the so-called copying of a book (in a state, whose law would recognize no copyright) naturally would be theft.
A material object is subject to property rights in the proper sense, and therefore for its transfer. A material object comes by the possession of its owner to its first and main destination. But spoken thoughts fall not naturally within the scope of the commonly and generally accepted ownership right. A thought is on the contrary spoken with the objective to make them as much as possible public property. The author achieves the main objective of his work if he transfers his thought as completely as possible into the mind of his fellow men; he should like to see that thought genuinely repeated and reproduced. Be it that it be done by the sound of the live voice, be it through the written word, or be it by any other means of reproduction. A thought, once spoken, no longer belongs to the author; has become public property. If one nonetheless wishes, on account of very understandable concern for the material needs of the author, to leave the unspoken thought still to some extent at his (or his assignees') disposal, -- this can not happen differently than by special legislation, to which the state in any case has the right; but the right resulting from this is by no means a natural right, and therefore one should not call someone, who would not observe that right in a state where the right would not have created it, a thief .
To copy a book in such a state is no more theft than to imitate a house. It has never occurred to anyone to say: that builder or architect has robbed his neighbor by

building a house the same as his. That tailor or seamstress has committed a theft by manufacturing coat or frock entirely the same as an existent coat or frock. Those cases are completely equal. The copier, the imitating builder, the immitating cutter find a designed thought expressed in a certain form, and imitate that expressed thought literally in the material (paper and ink, stone and wood, wool or silk) which is their property.
Noone accuses the reciter of theft, who recites a poem that he had heard or read somewhere the day before; and one would speak of theft with the reciting of sentences by different reciters, which together form a theater group! One has not observed the droit d'auteur! In the natural order, meanwhile, this droit d'auteur does not exist, it is only brought to life by agreement and for particular reasons. Once incorporated as part of the legislation, it is just as valid as the right of eminent domain of the state. The state can create ownership and declare ownership void; but such rights do not follow the natural conditions of a reasonable society: they are rights, which are brought to life, more or less fairly, by the state.
This what concerns the principles.
The copyright is not a natural right. It derives its immunity from the constitution. That contitution is not binding beyond the nation's borders; unless international treaties come into being, which give further effect to the protected privilege. It is therefore, in case such treaties do not exist, in fairness impossible to speak of theft or freebooting if one copies a book in the Netherlands, which has been published in Germany. In the Netherlands, one immitates so many garments, which have been released in Paris; and thereby noone has ever been thinking of theft or freebooting (thought + form = book = garment).
So, to make the German copyright binding for the Netherlands, one should not rely on the general principles of fairness. They have nothing to do with it. One is due respect to the law; hence also to the treaties; therefore, one needs to save oneself from entering into disadvantageous treaties.
In healthy commerce, buyer and seller, both of the exchangers, should be equally much benefited by the sale or exchange. Who acts differently, acts foolishly; or at least, not common for a merchant.
A treaty on the protection of international copyright is a purchase agreement. Should there be no gain from concluding it, then one should not enter into it. Now, it is clear that the Dutch people are better served by the copying of the expensive German books, than Germany by the right to copy books of Holland in its country. Abroad, nearly no one concerns itself with Dutch books. The foreign governments can therefore lightly give up the right to immitate books from Holland; but we do benefit from the freedom of the press in relation to foreign products, and can still expect to see much more advantage, as the reading of foreign language increases with us, and the German book prices will climb in proportion to Germany reserving itself more and more the monopoly of its books (compared to other states).

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SUBMITTED LETTERS.

The words of Mr. Alberdingk Thyme on the literary property rights in the last Nr. of the Newsletters will certainly have surprised many. Surely, it is generally known that the literary property as such is recognized in recent years by the laws of all civilized nations. Over 20 years ago, there was still raised a voice against by the radical American Republican Carey, who among others argued that Dickens had derived his creations from the public, and that the public, by copying his works, did nothing but take back what was taken away! The same radical sentiments Mr. A. Th still shares, but it has eluded him that by literary property is understood to be not the thought, but the form in which that thought is clad. In a building or a garment the form is -- the thought.
This what concerns the principles.
The copyright is thus indeed property. Therefore, one has to try to protect this as any other property, also by international treaties. The "fairness principles" brought with them, that once a right has been recognized, this should apply both inside and outside the borders of a country. The Netherlands has also concluded such treaties with Belgium, France and Spain, why should it not do so with Germany, England, Italy, etc.?
"Because abroad noone concerns itself with books from Holland," says Mr. A. Th. I am convinced of the


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opposite 1), but if this were the case, could that reason be applied where it concerns the application of recognized principles of fairness and equity? Can there still be doubt about this? Further explanation seems to me entirely unnecessary, but I like to refer Mr. A. Th., and those who still share his feelings, to the moreover well-known works of Renouard, Wachter, the Compte-rendu du Congres de la propriete litteraire et artistique, and so many others, that, one might venture to say, have exhausted these issues.

Mr. Martinus Nijhoff.

1) Also at the Congress in Maastricht, this has been contradicted by a Dutch man of letters, who complained about the restricting of his rights as a writer in Germany, and also put forward on those grounds the proposal that the desirability of a treaty with Germany would be pronounced by the Congress.

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SUBMITTED LETTERS.

Mister Editor!

Undoubtedly, the remarkable article by Mr. JA Alberdingk Thyme defending copying in your number 3 will not remain without contradiction.
One does not slap in the face unpunished an opinion, sanctified and enforced by all nations that possess a literature! And whoever is familiar with the combative nature of our famous colleague, would almost come to the thought that he has written his bold statements -- only from the desire to provoke a fight.
Meanwhile, the reasonings of Mr. AT were not all new to me. They are pretty well in line with those of Mr. Winckel, expressed during the time of the Gazette of Samarang (denounced so fiercely by Ms. Mina Kruseman), and also I think to have found them occasionally in these Newsletters -- but never in such a beautiful, sharp form, which only the stylist A. T enviably possessess.
I will therefore not venture too far into the arena with him!
Only this comment:
The repeatedly used comparisons of similarity between an immitating builder, an imitating cutter, and a copier relative to the originator, call him engineer, cutter or author, are, in my opinion, utterly false and untrue.
Mr. A.T. agrees that the workman is worthy of his wages, and that the author may demand reward for his work. And he should, because as a rule he could not live without, and could not continue to create.
Now, the author of a building (engineer), or a frock or coat (seamstress or cutter), unlike a book writer, obtain their reward from the first or in several copies more of the work published!
Thus the engineer makes the drawing or plan of a building, and its copy (he will charge NLG 100 or NLG 1000 for it) is included in the cost of the one (if need be two buildings at the same time) that the architect (the publisher) will build. And once completed, the engineer and architect are relatively indifferent to one imitating it. But woe! If the plan was stolen in the meantime, and another thereafter has put together a similar building. That would be copying-theft!
With seasonal change, a Parisian milliner invents one or more model-hats of wholly varying shapes. Only trusted retailers are initially admitted into her sanctuary, and buy the model hats of her for a high fee. I remember very well that in my youth, my sisters were not allowed to buy model-hats because they cost the four-and five double of an imitation hat! Why? Because the reward of the inventor (author) was included in those first hats! Once public, the immitation (copy) left the publisher indifferent. She and the author had been rewarded!
Thus will it also go when a new coat or gown is invented once, which (please note!) "does not correspond with the existing." If it still concerns only changes to an old form, immitation is equivalent to an illustrated edition of a book whose original property rights have expired!

Set across these cases now (always from a material point of view) the publication of a collective of the mind!
It is impossible for author and publisher to obtain their reward from the first copy, or from a limited number thereof. This reward lies in a more or less significant amount which must be distributed to the public at a given moment, and each in itself represents a very small part of the author's reward.
Time and ingenuity will still be required for the imitating of a building; whereas more hamfisted work is not conceivable than re-typesetting and reprinting of the letters of a book in which the author has laid down all his intellect and work force.
And this author can only obtain reward after the product of his mind, multiplied by the printing press, has been valued unviolated to a certain quantity only to his benefit (of course including the cost of reproduction).
If there exist no supernatural powers that can bring this about, it is indeed a natural law ratified by the state, which thus protect the intellectual property. And the copyright has as much "reason to exist" as any material property rights.
One should note, however, that I still consider the matter entirely from the point of view also put first by Mr. AT: that the workman is worthy of his wages, and as such is entitled to claim them; and therefore an intellectual worker forms no exception.
Once accepted: that the copyright, as every property by its nature demands protection, and copying should be criminalized as theft, concerning the copying from abroad could only rise this question: what is worse, to rob the open garden of his father, or his neighbor's!

Leiden, 6 Sept. 1875. Gualth. Kolff.

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SUBMITTED LETTERS.

To the Editors of the Newsletter.

I am delighted to see that Misters Mart. Nijhoff and Gualth. Kolff stand up for what they believe to be the endangered rights of the authors and buyers of manuscripts. It does honour to their hearts in any case. However, this very noble organ often, in arguments, plays eccentric tricks on a certain other ability. The other ability is judgment.
Now to the judgment of the mentioned reputable collegues, I cannot give unconditional praise.
It does not make for strength, accuracy and independence of judgment, if one, in a case that straightforwardly belongs to the realm of reason, tries to beat his opponent by relying on a more or less general opinion. One should employ arguments.
Mister Nijhoff says that the thoughts are not subject to the application of the natural property rights; but the form in which ideas are clad. This is (within the subject, with which we are concerned) the audible or visual ensemble of the words, the sentences in which a writer expresses his thoughts. So the question is: does the natural sense of justice prohibit to repeat, to reproduce, the ensemble of words or sentences in which a writer has openly expressed his thoughts: is the form of a thought in that sense the property of the speaker or writer, so that someone who wishes to remain honest, may not repeat, reproduce, nor multiply, that which has been openly made public and the public intellect in printed form?
The form of an architectural thought is, among others -- the building. The form of a certain propelling force, in which causes and effects are active, is among others -- the machine. The form of a certain deep moving of the soul, is among others -- the song. The form of a certain sense

of physical and aesthetic need is among others -- the mantle. The form of a certain impact of characters is among others -- the novel. Is it permissible, once those creations, without express reservation by the state, have been given up to the receptacle of the public perception, to repeat those creations -- yes or no? Is it permissible, if no patent or privilege had been issued, no special law, -- is it then permissible or not to copy these creations from the material -- stone, iron, the human voice, cloth, paper and ink -- belonging to us? -- Give me a categoric answer thereon.
The examples, which Mr. Kolff cites, on the way in which an engineer or milliner may be victim of robbery do not apply to the usual copying. They are equal to the secretly or violently stealing and copying of a manuschript that the author had thought safe in his secretaire. We speak here of thoughts that they have already, in a certain form, given up to the public.
The poet seme son ame au vent. That is what the artist does, the state philosopher, so does the explorer, so does the hero: all geniuses do so. That cannot be changed. If someone would have discovered the means, which made sea water, brought to a certain degree of heat, and cooled in an earthen container, drinkable, one could reward him generously for that invention -- but they would not dare claim that it would be theft to apply this on a ship, in case of lack of drinking water. One can, one may nevertheless commit the gross economistic inconsequence of creating property rights of spoken thoughts; to impede the propagation of ideas in its equal form -- out of love for the material needs of the inventors.
I repeat, I do not disapprove of this, as a special measure. The workman is worthy of his wages. Would a first publisher with whom an author negotiates not dare to exploit in the field of freedom, out of fear of being overshadowed by the competition -- It is all good to me: let one make laws on literary property.
However, that they are not grounded in the general human need and general sense of justice, is proven by the most occurring press phenomenon of our times -- journalism. The newspapers copy extensively -- among the highest acclaim of the severest protectionist.
Moreover, I am not alone in my thoughts on this matter in this country. I rely on the example of the Justice (my townsman) Abr. De Vries, Master of Law, who, 34 years ago, in his academic dissertation on the racy subject of letter writing, has already demonstrated the vanity of a natural copyright: De Commercio epistolarum ex juris principiis aestimato. (P. N. van Kampen 1841). See in particular pp. 119-125.

11 Sept. J.A. Alb. Th.

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Translation by: Miluska Kooij

    


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