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Hegel: Remarks on Intellectual Property, Berlin (1821)
Source: Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin - Preußischer Kulturbesitz Libr.impr.c.n.mss.oct.126
Citation:
Hegel: Remarks on Intellectual Property, Berlin (1821), Primary Sources on Copyright (1450-1900), eds L. Bently & M. Kretschmer, www.copyrighthistory.org
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75
There is therefore no unqualified right to sacrifice one's life. To
such a sacrifice nothing is entitled except an ethical Idea as that
in which this immediately single personality has vanished and to
whose power it is actually subjected. Just as life as such is
immediate, so death is its immediate negation and hence must come
from without, either by natural causes, or else, in the service of
the Idea, by the hand of a foreigner.*
Transition from Property to Contract
§ 71
Existence as determinate being is in essence being for another
(see Remark to § 48). One aspect of property is that it is an existent
as an external thing, and in this respect property exists for other
external things and is connected with their necessity and contingency.
But it is also an existent as an embodiment of the will, and from
this point of view the 'other' for which it exists can only be the
will of another person. This relation of will to will is the true and
proper ground in which freedom is existent. — The sphere of contract
is made up of this mediation whereby I hold property not merely by
means of a thing and my subjective will, but by means of another
person's will as well and so hold it in virtue of my participation
in a common will.
Reason makes it just as necessary for men to enter into contractual
relationship — gift, exchange, trade, etc.- as to possess property
(see Remark to § 45) — While all
_____________
*) A single person, I need hardly say, is something subordinate,
and as such he must dedicate himself to the ethical whole. Hence if
the state claims life, the individual must surrender it. But may a
man take his own life? Suicide may at a first glance be regarded as
an act of courage, but only the false courage of tailors and servant
girls. Or again looked upon as a misfortune, since it is inward
derangement which leads to it. But the fundamental question is: Have
I a right to take my life? The answer will be that I, as this
individual, am not master of my life, because life, as the comprehensive
sum of, my activity, is nothing external to personality, which itself
is this immediate personality. Thus when a person is said to have a
right over his life, the words are a contradiction, because they mean
that a person has a right over himself. But he has no such right,
since he does not stand over himself and he cannot pass judgement on
himself. When Hercules destroyed himself by fire and when Brutus
fell on his sword, this was the conduct of a hero against his
personality. But as for an unqualified right to suicide, we must
simply say that there is no such thing, even for heroes.
(Addition by Eduard Gans based on the lecture notes of H. G. Hotho)
No Transcription available.
Source: Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin - Preußischer Kulturbesitz Libr.impr.c.n.mss.oct.126
Citation:
Hegel: Remarks on Intellectual Property, Berlin (1821), Primary Sources on Copyright (1450-1900), eds L. Bently & M. Kretschmer, www.copyrighthistory.org
Back | Record | Images | Commentaries: [1]
Translation only | Transcription only | Show all | Bundled images as pdf
There is therefore no unqualified right to sacrifice one's life. To
such a sacrifice nothing is entitled except an ethical Idea as that
in which this immediately single personality has vanished and to
whose power it is actually subjected. Just as life as such is
immediate, so death is its immediate negation and hence must come
from without, either by natural causes, or else, in the service of
the Idea, by the hand of a foreigner.*
Existence as determinate being is in essence being for another
(see Remark to § 48). One aspect of property is that it is an existent
as an external thing, and in this respect property exists for other
external things and is connected with their necessity and contingency.
But it is also an existent as an embodiment of the will, and from
this point of view the 'other' for which it exists can only be the
will of another person. This relation of will to will is the true and
proper ground in which freedom is existent. — The sphere of contract
is made up of this mediation whereby I hold property not merely by
means of a thing and my subjective will, but by means of another
person's will as well and so hold it in virtue of my participation
in a common will.
Reason makes it just as necessary for men to enter into contractual
relationship — gift, exchange, trade, etc.- as to possess property
(see Remark to § 45) — While all
_____________
*) A single person, I need hardly say, is something subordinate,
and as such he must dedicate himself to the ethical whole. Hence if
the state claims life, the individual must surrender it. But may a
man take his own life? Suicide may at a first glance be regarded as
an act of courage, but only the false courage of tailors and servant
girls. Or again looked upon as a misfortune, since it is inward
derangement which leads to it. But the fundamental question is: Have
I a right to take my life? The answer will be that I, as this
individual, am not master of my life, because life, as the comprehensive
sum of, my activity, is nothing external to personality, which itself
is this immediate personality. Thus when a person is said to have a
right over his life, the words are a contradiction, because they mean
that a person has a right over himself. But he has no such right,
since he does not stand over himself and he cannot pass judgement on
himself. When Hercules destroyed himself by fire and when Brutus
fell on his sword, this was the conduct of a hero against his
personality. But as for an unqualified right to suicide, we must
simply say that there is no such thing, even for heroes.
(Addition by Eduard Gans based on the lecture notes of H. G. Hotho)
No Transcription available.