

Tonson *against* Collins.*Books*

ACTION on the Case, for selling certain Books called the Spectators, printed without any Licence or Consent from the sole and true Proprietors of the Copy thereof, *viz.* the Plaintiffs, to their Injury and Damage. On Not Guilty pleaded, the Jury found a special Verdict to the following Effect.

Qu. Whether Copyright subsists in Authors, as a valuable Property, independant of the Stat. 8 Ann.

“ That the Spectator is an original Composition, by natural
 “ born Subjects resident in *England*, *viz.* Mr. *Addison*, Sir R.
 “ *Steele*, &c. first published A. D. 1711. That *Jacob Tonson*
 “ deceased, in 1712 purchased of the Authors for a valuable
 “ Consideration, the said Work, to him and his Assigns for
 “ ever. That the Plaintiffs *Jacob* and *Richard* are his personal
 “ Representatives and Assigns. That old *Jacob* in his Life-
 “ time, and the Plaintiffs since his Death, have constantly printed
 “ and sold the said Work as their Property; and now have and al-
 “ ways have had a sufficient Number of Books of the said Work,
 “ exposed to Sale at a reasonable Price. That before the Reign
 “ of *Queen Anne*, it was usual to purchase from Authors the
 “ perpetual Copy-right of their Books, and to assign the same
 “ for valuable Consideration, and to settle them in Family Set-
 “ tlements, for the Provision of Wives and Children. That,
 “ to secure the Enjoyment of said Copy-right, the Stationer’s
 “ Company have made several By-Laws; particularly, one dated
 “ 17 August 1681. and another, dated 14 May 1694, (therein
 “ set forth) reciting and recognizing, in the strongest Terms,
 “ the Copy-right of Authors and their Assigns, and prohibiting
 “ any Infraction of such Right by Members of their Company,
 “ under certain pecuniary penalties. That the said *Jacob*
 “ *Tonson* deceased complied with the Conditions required by the
 “ said Company, to ascertain his Right, by registering the said
 “ Work as soon as he had purchased the Copy. That the De-
 “ fendant without Licence of the Plaintiffs, and knowing the
 “ said Copy to have been purchased by said *Jacob Tonson* de-
 “ ceased, printed, published, and sold several Copies of the
 “ same in *April* and *May* 1759, whereby the Plaintiffs were
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“damnified; but whether the Defendant is liable in Law to answer the Damages, they are ignorant. But if the Court shall adjudge him liable, they find him Guilty, Damages 5*l.* if otherwise, Not Guilty.”

Wedderburn for the Plaintiff.

The general Question will turn on the Right of the Plaintiffs. For sufficient Acts of the Defendant are found, of infringing that Right if existing: Which Right, if any, must be a Right of Property at Common Law; for this Case is quite out of the Statute of Queen *Anne*. The Right of Authors in general is now to be determined; not of any particular Bookseller. — From the Industry of the Author, a Profit must arise to somebody: I contend it belongs to the Author; and when I speak of the Right of Property, I mean in the Profits of his Book; not in the Sentiments, Style, &c. I shall endeavour to shew,

I. That this Right is as well founded as any other Right of Property.

II. That it is also recognized by the Laws of *England*.

I. Property, according to *Selden, Mar. Claus.* is *Jus utendi, fruendi, alienandi, &c.* Different Originals are assigned of the Right of Property. All agree, that it's final Cause is to promote the Industry of Individuals. Property at first continued only as long as Possession; then, was extended for Life; then, was transmissible to Representatives; lastly, was refined into the Multiplicity of Rights we now experience.

According to *Grotius*, Invention is one Ground of Property; Occupancy another. The present Ground is Invention.

While a Work is in Manuscript, the Author has intire Dominion over it. Courts have interposed, to stop it's Publication by other Men. *Webb and Rose. Forester and Walker.* Late Case of Lord *Clarendon's* Manuscripts in Chancery. If, instead of copying by Clerks, an Author prints for the Use of his Friends; he gives them no Right over the Copies. Pro-
ccc

ceed one Step farther: If he publishes by Subscription, and no Books are delivered but to Subscribers; they have no Right over the Copies, but only to use them. This leads us to a general Publication: There also every Purchaser has a Right to use, but nothing farther. The Profits of the Sale must go to Somebody. The Printer and other mechanic Artists concerned in the Impression are paid for their Parts; the Author who is the first Mover ought in Justice to be paid too.

This Doctrine is also consistent with public Utility. Learning would be prejudiced, if Authors may be stripped of this independent Provision for themselves.]

It may be objected, 1st. That this Right is incapable of Possession. — Not more than Advowsons and other incorporeal Rights are. 2dly. It is impossible to be guarded. — Laws are the Guard of Property in Society, not Bolts and Bars. This very Action is a Proof, that it may be guarded.

II. This Right is recognized by the Laws of *England*.

Manuscripts are quite out of the Case. They could produce no Profit. Therefore I shall begin from the Introduction of Printing by *Caxton* in 1471, (for *Dr. Middleton* has confuted the Story of it's prior Importation at the King's Expence) and herein shall rely principally on *Ames's* typographical Antiquities. *Caxton's* Books were all printed at the Expence of private Persons. *Pynson's* and *De Werde's*, the same. There were then no Profits, or but little, arising from the Impression. About 1500, the Encouragement arising from Sale began to be sufficient, without Patronage. Since 1506, no Books have been printed at the private Expence of Patrons. But now they began to be printed, *cum Privilegio ad imprimendum solum*. These Privileges do not contradict the Idea of a prior Right of Property; they only support and protect it. *Henry 8th's* Book on the Sacraments was printed 1521, *cum Privilegio*. This he gave the Printers, in his private Right as Author. Another antient Book called the *Customs of London* having no certain Author, has therefore no Privilege.

About

About this Time the Crown began to exert it's Prerogative Copy-right; which shews, that a Copy-right *may* exist. There was no King's Printer by Patent, till the Reign of *Edw. 6.* He granted one to *Grafton*, with some Exceptions, as of Grammars; which were then the Property of *Barthelet*, Printer to *Hen. 8.*, being Books composed at the King's Expence. In *Rym. XV. 150.* There is a Patent for printing Greek and Hebrew. This arose from the great Expence of purchasing Manuscripts. There could be no Copy-right in Classic Books; therefore, the King seized them, as *Bona nullius* and Things *derelict*. These Patents are most of them for Bibles, &c. which are Things gained at the Expence of the Crown, and therefore they are the Subject of Copy-right; — or for Almanacks, &c. which are Things *derelict*. One Patent indeed goes out of this Rule; that for printing Law Books. I cannot account for the Principle upon which that is founded.

Next came the Power of Licensing, which arose from the religious Disputes then prevalent. This made Printing be looked upon all over *Europe*, as a Matter of State, and proper to be regulated by Law.

In 1537, *Hen. 8.* published a Proclamation against printing without Licence. *Fox 572.* In 1555, another, ordering the Possessors of heretical Books to burn them; else, to be accounted Rebels, and executed by military Law. The same King erected the Company of Stationers, professedly to regulate the Press. His Charter was confirmed by Queen *Elizabeth* in 1558. In 1556, a Decree of the Star Chamber regulated the Manner of printing, and Number of Presses. *Ames 534.* In 1583 two Printers *Wolf* and *Ward* insisted upon a Right of printing all Books, even where there were Copy-rights existing. *Stowe, 223, tit. Stationer's Company.* But Commissioners appointed by the Crown willed them to desist. In 1585, another Decree of the Star Chamber, that no Man should print Books, whereof the Property was in others, according to the allowed Ordinances of the Stationer's Company. In 1583 several Printers surrendered certain Copy-rights, to the Use of the Poor of the Company of Stationers; reserving a Power of printing them at the lowest Rates. *Ames 551.* This shews, that the

Profits of Publication were then usually assigned. *Tottel* had several Copy-rights. This Severity of the Star-chamber had no good End. Another Decree of the Star-chamber was made in 1637, modelled on that of *Qu. Eliz.* During the ensuing Usurpation, the same tyrannical Powers were exerted. After the Restoration, the Statute of the 13 & 14 *Car. 2.* was modelled on the Star-chamber Decrees, and states, that many had the Right solely to print, talks of the Owner's Consent, and gives a Penalty in case of Transgression, to the Owners of Books and Copies. Though all these Restrictions were founded on wrong Principles of Policy, yet they are strong Arguments of a generally-allowed pre-existing Copy-right.

As to the Law Patent (the best Account of which is in the Case of *Roper and Streeter in Carter*) whatever Validity it may have, it can have no Effect on the present Question. It confines the Author of a Law Book, to print with a particular Person. It does not take away any Copy-right.

Few Precedents to be met with in the Books. *Ponder and Braddel. 13 Car. 2. Lill. Entr. 67.* Action upon the Property of the *Pilgrim's Progress.* What Cases there are, are ill reported; being all on Patent Rights, and therefore the Law Printers would only print the Arguments on one Side. In 1 *Mod. 256.* Property of Almanacks are said to be the King's, first because derelict; secondly, as Prerogative Copies, since they regulate the Feasts of the Church.—The Expiration of the Licensing Act of *Car. 2.* gave rise to the Statute of *Qu. Anne;* which recognizes Authors as Proprietors; and gives particular Remedies by a penal Action. It takes away no antecedent Right. There is a saving Clause of all antecedent Rights. The Words, “for fourteen Years and no longer,” extend only to the accumulative Remedy by penal Action.

There have been many Cases in Chancery, wherein Injunctions have been granted, to restrain the Sale of Books, in prejudice to the Proprietors of Copy Rights. *Motte and Falkner* before *Talbot C. 1735.*—*Eyre and Walker, coram Talbot C. 1735.*—*Walshoe and Walker, 1736. coram Jekyll M. R.*—The Case of *Gay's Works* in 1737, where Lord Chancellor made

the Injunction perpetual; which he could not have done merely under the Act. *Austen and Cave*, 1739.

In fine, this Species of Property is acknowledged by Act of Parliament—Long understood to be vested, and made the Subject of Family Settlements—Recognized by the Court of Chancery. Therefore, we presume that a Court of Law will allow an Action on the Case to lie for it's Violation.

Thurlow for the Defendant.

The Right contended for, if it exists, must arise from either
1. Privilege. 2. Common Law Property. It supposes a Right to multiply Copies *in infinitum*; and to exclude other Persons from making Profit by multiplying them.

Some Parts of the Verdict quite out of the Case. It is of no Consequence, whether the Authors are natural born Subjects or no; because this Right of Property, if any, is personal; and may be acquired by Aliens.—Of no Consequence *now*, that they continued to publish it. If there be any Property, they may use it as they please. It might have been an Ingredient at the Trial, by which to measure the Damages.

The Case has not been argued as a Right arising from Privilege, or flowing from any Act of the State. I shall therefore insist,

I. That it does not exist naturally or flow from natural Law.

II. That where this Kind of Property has been spoken of by learned Men, or even by Courts of Justice, it had Reference to the extraordinary Acts of the State.

I. Public Utility, &c. points one Way as well as the other. It is useful to the Public, that a Monopoly should be abolished. The Establishment of Copy-right may tend to the Advantage of Authors; not of the Public. When a perpetual Monopoly is established, Printers who purchase Copies will print in the vilest

vilest and the cheapest Manner; which will make the Curious resort to foreign Countries. The Act of Parliament therefore wisely gives a *limited* Monopoly, and not a *perpetual*.

Property in the Profits of Publication must presuppose Property in the Thing itself. And the Subject of this Property, if any, must be in the abstracted, ideal, incorporeal Composition. Now the Idea of the Composition, as it lies in the Author's Mind, before it is substantiated by reducing it into Writing, has no one Idea of Property annexed to it.

In the *Roman* Law, there was a Question concerning Specification, long debated between the *Proculi* and *Sabini*. If I write any *Carmen &c.* on the Materials whereon *Titius* has wrote his *Carmen &c.* before, it belongs to *Titius*, *jure Specificationis*. *Vide Institut.* and *Puffendorf* on the Subject; who observes, that this is not an *original* Method of acquiring Property, but merely by *Contract*. See also *Seld. Mare Claus. cap. 22.*

Publications by Subscription shew, that there is a Method, by which an Author may gain a Profit for his Works, without resorting to any Copy-right. I insist, that every Subscriber has a Right, to do what he pleases with the Book he has so subscribed for.

It will be difficult to shew the Remedy of such a Right as this. Will the Remedy lie against the Keepers of Circulating Libraries, who buy one Copy, and hire it to an hundred to read?—Or against a Man who lends it gratis? Both gratify the Curiosity of others, and stop the Sale of the Book.

It will be difficult to confine this merely to Books, and not extend it to other Inventions. A learned Author* has endeavoured at it, and brangled it, and made miserable Stuff of it. He attempts a Distinction between the Labour of the Head and of the Hand. But in some Machines the Labour of the Head is much greater than that of the Hand. Sir *Isaac Newton* had no greater Property in his *Principia*, than Lord *Orrery* had in his Machine. If the Labour of the Head gives the Right, the Property is just the same. And it is possible, that the Invention

*Bishop Warburton.

vention of a Mousetrap might cost it's Author the same Labour of Head, that the Orrery did it's noble Contriver. So that this Ground of Property depends entirely upon the Difference of Heads. The Right of Property in Books and Machines is therefore the same. Both have arisen from

II. The extraordinary Acts of the State.

The Licencing Acts began in *England* in 1400 and odd. Before that, no Marks appear of Property in Books. *St. Ambrose de Vitis Patrum* appears from *Ames*, to have been licensed by the Archbishop. In *Caius Coll.* Library at *Cambridge*, there are many Books, in MS. as well as Print, published under Licence. From 1539 Privileging and Printing went Hand in Hand, Printing being supposed a Flower of the Crown. Indeed there are great Arguments for supposing, that Printing was imported by the Crown. Lord *Coke* says so—And *Polydore Vergil* the same, in the Reign of *Henry 8th.* Be this as it will; the Privileges granted imply no Idea whatsoever of Copy-right in Authors. They relate merely to Printers, as if in nature of a Patent for this new Invention of Publication. In 1551, Licence granted to *Laurentius Torrentinus* to print the *Pisan Code.* Here was nothing new in the Invention of the Book: The Encouragement is to the Labour of Printing. *Qu. Eliz.* granted a Patent for the sole Printing of Music.—Another for Maps of *England*,—Another for Latin, &c.—All these Patents are totally foreign to any Notion of Copy-right. They rather exclude it,

The Reasons of creating this exclusive Property in Printers, were Reasons of State. *Darey and Allen. Moor. 671.* The Privilege for sole printing was held to be good, for the Peace and Safety of the Realm. So in *Holland*, a theological Controversy once ran so high, that the State enjoined the Disputants to proceed no farther, lest they should offend *contra bonos mores.* At length it was provided in 1556, that no one should print Books without Leave from the Company of Stationers.

In 43 *Eliz.* among other Complaints of Monopolies, by the House of Commons, a Monopoly of the Translation of *Tacitus* was complained of; which shews very little Regard to any

Right, of either Authors or Translators. The Stat. 21 *Jac.* 1. gives to the Crown the Right of giving Privileges in Matters of Printing: Which shews, that the Property was supposed to be derived from the Crown.

The Word Property in the Statute of Queen *Anne* arises from the Wording of the Orders of the Company of Stationers in 1691; who were fond enough of asserting such a Right. This Statute provides, that if the Author overlives fourteen Years, the Property shall return to him: that is, it shall no longer remain in the Printer, according to the Orders of the Stationer's Company. Suppose now the Author had assigned it for fifty Years; I should contend, that the Subject-Matter of this Assignment is, by the Statute, made incapable of subsisting for more than fourteen Years. By one Clause in the Statute of Queen *Anne*, certain great Officers were enabled to regulate the Prices of Books; not only of those entered at Stationer's Hall, but of all others. This would not have been repealed, had the Legislature thought, a Property attached in Authors exclusive of the Terms in this Statute. For it would be extremely inconvenient, if no Power of Regulation were vested any where. For then Authors might set what Price upon their Works they pleased; since no Action can lie against them, for abusing their Power.

This is the first Action ever known to be brought upon this Head of Property; (for the Declaration in *Lilly's* Entries is the mere Invention of the Author) and therefore ought not to be received. *Littleton*, Chapter Knight's Service, says, No Action can be brought upon the Statute of *Merton* for disparaging an Heir, because none ever had been brought. *Diversity of Courts* says, Writ of Error will run to the five Ports; *Brooke* says the like: But in *Dyer* 376, Because none ever had gone, it was determined none ever should go. Year-Book 39 *Hen.* 6. A Royal Protection to the King's Proctor at *Rome* disallowed, because none ever granted before. — The Cases in Chancery are none of them opposite to this Doctrine. The Injunctions granted are all of them since the Statute of Queen *Anne*, which clearly vests an absolute Right in Authors, &c. for fourteen Years. In the late Case of *Tonson* and *Walker*, about *Newton's* Edition of

Milton, Lord Chancellor did not determine upon the general Right of Property, but upon the Statute. For Dr. *Newton's* Notes were clearly within the Term. However an Injunction in Chancery is not conclusive to the Right. It is not that solemn Adjudication, which the Law requires.

Wedderburn in Reply.

The Jurisdiction of the Court of *Chancery*, to grant Injunction in these Cases, well supported, by the Finding of the Jury that this is a customary Property.

The Profits of Authors, &c. must arise from an extensive Sale. It is therefore their Interest to publish Books in the best and the cheapest Manner. But if they did not, this is only *Argumentum ab Abusu*. If this Right be abused, you may lay Restrictions upon it, as was done by Stat. 8 *Ann.* though that Clause is now repealed by 8 *Geo.* 2.

Books cannot be compared to mechanical Inventions, with any Propriety: For those are capable of Improvement, at every Copy made. Books are usually reprinted *verbatim*. We allow, that Reasons of State gave Birth to exclusive Patents; but deny, that such Patents gave Original to or interfered with Copy-rights. Patents were chiefly in Favour of Printers, being a new Art which tended to diffuse Knowledge. Learned Men were originally rewarded by the Emoluments they received, from the Resort of Pupils. When their Learning came to be diffused by Books, Society gave them this Recompence instead of it; which we hope the Court will protect.

Lord *Mansfield* Chief Justice. Let this Case stand over for farther Argument. There is no Doubt, but the Violation of that Property, which may be the Subject of an Injunction in Chancery, will maintain an Action on the Case in this Court. Because every Injunction proceeds upon the Supposition of a legal Property. There are two Sorts of Cases in the Court of Chancery, which I desire may be looked into;

1st. Where there hath been no Printing or Publication at all. The Statute of Queen *Anne* seems evidently to distinguish this,

from other Cases. In the Case of the Edition of *Pope's* Letters to *Swift*, the Question was, Whether the Property was not transferred to the Correspondent. Lord *Hardwicke* thought not, and that the Writer was still the Proprietor, and therefore granted an Injunction against the Assignee of *Swift*.

2d. Where the Term given by Act of Parliament has been clearly expired. I remember no Case, where the Merits have been fully argued, and the Injunction made perpetual, at the Hearing of the Cause; therefore, they are not quite decisive; and yet they have great Authority. They at least answer the Objection against the Difuse of these Actions; since the Parties injured have followed their Remedy, in another Court.

In *Tonson* and *Walker*, Lord *Hardwicke* inclined to the Property; but sent it to Law. It was there twice argued, but never certified. The Reason why he leant to the Property was, because in all Prerogative Causes of this Kind, the Counsel for the Crown had endeavoured (right or wrong) to put the Merits, on a supposed Property in the Crown: And it seemed to be universally acknowledged, that such a Property might be subsisting.

Let the Judges be attended with Copies of the Cases in Chancery. *post 321*

The King *against* Wheeler.

Motions

AN Attachment had issued against the Defendant, for disobeying an Award, and filing a Bill in Chancery against the Arbitrators; and he had been examined upon Interrogatories. *Morton* moved for the Master's Report, upon the last Day of the Term, without previous Leave of the Court; upon an Affidavit, that the Defendant had made the Proceedings on this very Attachment the Subject of a supplemental Bill, and had moved for an Injunction. Objection by *Howard*, that this Motion was irregular. But *per Cur.* In a Case so extraordinary as this, the Contempt being every Day increasing, the Court will dispense with their Rule. — However it being then objected, that the Defendant was not personally served with Notice of this Motion,

The Master's Report upon Interrogatories of Contempt, cannot be moved for, the last Day of the Term without previous Leave of the Court;

unless upon extraordinary Cases,

and personal Service of Notice.

but